What stops a stolen key, a greedy agent or a premature release, step by step. Scenarios backed by a real refused transaction on Diana testnet say so and link to it. The rest are walkthroughs of the rules, clearly marked as not executed.
An attacker steals an agent's secp256k1 private key, or breaks it with a future quantum computer.
Attacker signs a native transaction with the stolen key (not started)
Chain rejects the native transaction (blocked)
Attacker tries an EVM transaction instead (not started)
Rejected while no window is open (blocked)
If a window happens to be open (not started)
Not demonstrated
These steps follow the chain's and the contracts' documented rules. No attack has been staged, so nothing here claims the defence was observed.
What to do if it happens
Close any open EVM window, pause the vault, revoke the agent's limits, then register a new post-quantum key. The Threat Center lists these steps.
Live post-quantum posture of any address on Diana testnet: hybrid key status, QoreSeal key and EVM authorisation window.
Public address only. Never paste a private key or seed phrase here. This is a read-only query; nothing is signed or sent.